Here’s Part III in our “Charlie Coles” series on the evolution of offensive theory and best practice. 

If you’ve been following along, you’ve met Charlie, the colorful and highly successful coach of Miami of Ohio back in 1999, the last time the school played in the NCAA tourney prior to this past season’s appearance, and learned of his fascination with all things offense – its enduring principles and axioms, its elements and underlying structure. 

In his honor, Part II took us on a pseudo archaeological dig in which we explored “artifacts” of three different offenses we called Doc, Mac, and Noah.

Recall that these offenses were developed and played in eras spanning roughly 100 years, yet were remarkably similar to one another, even as they responded to vastly different circumstances, rules, and “customs” particular to their own spot on basketball’s historic timeline. 

Doc and Mac seemed to restrict players to a defined pattern dictated by circular movement while Noah was largely unscripted, the circular action a by-product or consequence of player choices, not the driver.

In Doc Carlson’s 1920’s Figure 8, we saw the interplay of three, tightly scripted patterns run over and over until a shooter could spring free for a shot attempt near the basket or separate from his defender long enough to attempt a two-handed set shot. Carlson coached in an era when shooting was confined to layups, hook shots and various kinds of floaters in the lane, and two-handed set shots from the perimeter. In each case, separating a player from his defender took time and patience. Consequently, he and other coaches emphasized deliberate, intricate passing and cutting as scoring opportunities surfaced only when the defense broke down or got “lazy.” There was no shot clock to speed up the possession and force a shot.

By 1954, with the widespread adoption of the jump shot and the freelance choices it enabled, operational tempo had greatly increased. John McGuire – Mac  –  responded appropriately, encouraging his players to break the weaving pattern that characterized his offense whenever they spied opportunities to gain separation more quickly through their own maneuvering. 

Finally, in the 2018, personal trainer Noah LaRoche exploited the circular movement once again, this time harnessing the potential of 3-point shooting, modern analytics, and a generation of superbly athletic players whose skill sets did not limit them to narrowly defined roles on the court. 

Most importantly, regardless of when and under what circumstances these offenses were conceived, we learned that Carlson, McGuire, and LaRoche had confronted the same design questions that have challenged every coach since James Naismith first introduced the game in 1891:

Since one and only one player can attempt a field goal at a time, how do we separate him from his defender and what do we do with his four teammates as the potential shot attempt unfolds? How do we coordinate their movement to prevent them from hindering their teammate’s scoring attempt while simultaneously positioning them to become offensive threats themselves if the shot is prevented and the shooter must find relief?

In doing so, we discovered that managing “time, space, and bodies” is the essential challenge shaping the evolution of offensive theory. 

To continue our investigation, what we need now is some additional historical context – a general timeline on which to hang Doc, Mac, and Noah, as well as the subsequent offensive artifacts we uncover in the weeks ahead.

Let’s begin by repeating a timeline I presented several years ago: six loosely defined time periods or phases, each characterized by one or more general trends that taken together provide a broad history of basketball. 

• Origins & Growing Pains, 1891 – 1919: Naismith’s vision and defining structure of the game; how early experimentation refined his original 13 rules and standardized the basket and backboard, the number of players, and the dimensions of the court. 

• Rise of the Coaching Fraternity, 1920 – 1932: Expansion of the game into different regions under the direction of an emerging group of “professional” coaches who sought to brand the game with their own unique styles and strategies. 

• Paradigm Shift, 1933 – 1950: A seventeen-year stretch of tremendous ferment during which basketball’s regional, parochial nature gives way to a truly national game; sportswriter Edward “Ned” Irish begins promoting college double-headers in Madison Square Garden, attracting teams from the mid and far west regions of the nation, exposing the game’s fan base and coaches to different styles of play; the center jump after every score is eliminated leading to a game of continuous action and greater scoring; the two-handed set shot gives way to the jump shot; the first NIT and NCAA tournaments are played; the 1936 Olympics followed by WWII spreads basketball across the globe.

• The Modern Game, 1951 – 1978: Basketball’s coming-of-age period; the jump shot becomes the game’s primary offensive weapon; NCAA scoring climbs dramatically, increasing an average of 15 points per game by 1971; stylish inner-city black players popularize “urban cool,” slam dunking, and one-on-one freelance; Mississippi State challenges the southern color barrier, sneaking across state lines to play an integrated Loyola Chicago team in the 1963 NCAA tournament, followed three years later when Texas Western starts five blacks against Kentucky’s all-white lineup and wins the national championship; nationally televised college games become a regular feature on the major networks; UCLA’s John Wooden wins ten national titles in twelve years; Larry Bird squares off against Magic Johnson in the 1978-79 NCAA championship game, cementing the tournament’s growing prominence.

• March Madness, 1979 – 2000: ESPN debuts and the number of regional and national telecasts of college basketball explodes; the NCAA tournament expands to 64 teams and the tournament quickly rivals the Super Bowl and World Series as America’s premier sporting event; introduction of the 3-pointer and shot clock; North Carolina freshman Michael Jordan hits the winning basket in the 1982 national championship and soon becomes the iconic figure of the NBA; one of only three basketball coaches to win an NCAA title, NIT title, and an Olympic gold medal, Indiana’s Bob Knight is fired after decades of controversial sideline and off-the-court behavior.

• Conflict & Uncertainty in the Midst of Soaring Popularity, 2001 – 2026: Every tournament game broadcast in its entirety; the 3-point line is moved back twice and the shot clock reduced to 30 seconds; the rise of AAU, high school travel teams, and the decline of fundamentals; the rise of analytics, positionless basketball, and death of the big man; amateurism questioned as NIL, pay-for-play, transfer portal, and soaring coaching salaries dominate the headlines; the COVID pandemic cancels the 2019-20 tournament; the unintended consequences of the 3-pt shot are explored; the NBA’s financial ties to communist China sharply criticized; college basketball’s winningest coach, Mike Krzyzewski retires, along with several other prominent coaches, exhausted and demoralized by the decline of amateurism. 

To be sure, these time periods are arbitrary, overlapping and irregular, subject to debate depending on how one chooses to divide the game’s historical chapters. But they give us a start. 

The next step is to sharpen our focus, narrowing the lens to those events directly related to offensive design and best practice. When we do so, a compelling fault line emerges smack in the middle of the third phase, the seven-year period between 1936 and 1943 when three turning points occur in rapid succession:

• In 1936, the Collegiate Joint Rules Committee eliminates the mandatory jump ball after made free throws. That same year, in place of the customary two-handed set shot, Stanford’s Hank Luisetti thrills a Madison Square Garden crowd with his running, leaping, mid-air, one-handed “push” shot. 

• A year later, the rules committee compliments its 1936 decision, eliminating jump balls after made baskets. In other words, no longer will play stop after each and every score – free throws or baskets – requiring both teams to gather at center court for a jump ball to determine who next takes possession of the ball. Instead, changes in possession will now occur seamlessly without interruption.

• In 1943, another westerner, this time Wyoming’s Kenny Sailors, invades NYC and like Luisetti astounds the crowd with his one-handed shooting prowess. But unlike Luisetti who relied on a dribble or running motion to get airborne before pushing the ball toward the basket, Sailors jumps vertically. At the peak of his jump, he literally hangs in the air, the ball rolling off his fingertips in a motion that creates backspin and a softer touch. Shooting this way means that he has multiple ways to score because the vertical jump that precedes his shot is not pre-determined. He can execute the jump shot from a standing position as well as off a cut or a dribble. Moreover, off a catch, he can fake the jumper and drive to the basket, or after beginning the drive, suddenly pull-up and rise for the jumper.

The cumulative effect of these three events was seismic. Before, basketball was one kind of game; after, it was something altogether different. 

Eliminating the repetitive, time-wasting walk to the center of the court for a jump ball after each score produced a game of constant transition as teams seesawed in near seamless fashion from offense to defense and back again. Paired with Luisetti’s new style of shooting-on-the-move, followed by Sailors’ vertical jumper, the game sped up, producing more possessions, shot attempts, and scoring. 

In effect, we can draw a line through our six historic phases delineating the game’s shift from “before” to “after.” Then,with this fault line in place, we can go a step further. From an offensive perspective, our original six periods now collapse into two sets of two. 

Here’s what our timeline looks like now:

The lines separating these eras are not rigid. There are “shoulders” in each during which offenses slowly transition from the previous era to the style of play that defines the current one. For example, Era 4 begins in 1986 when the shot clock and 3-point arc are introduced, yet many coaches continued to run the same offenses they ran in Era 3.

For example, in the course of seventeen seasons beginning in 1975-76 and ending in 1991-92, Bobby Knight led Indiana to the NCAA Final Four, four times, two of them occurring before the 3-pointer and shot clock were approved and two after they were in place. Yet, there was little difference in Indiana’s style of play, pace, or scoring output during these before and after seasons. Knight ran his famous motion offense in combination with his denial defense, winning the national championship three times. 

In each of his first two Final Four seasons – 1975-76 and 1980-81—Indiana averaged 59 FGAs, 31 FGs, and 14 FTs for a scoring average of 76 points per game. Except for the player names, nothing really changed. 

In his last two Final Four seasons – 1986-87 and 1991-92 – with the 3-pointer and shot clock in play, Indiana’s seasonal scoring average increased to 81 PPG, a mere five points more than their two championship seasons when baskets counted only 2-points. Yet they continued to average 59 FGAs per season and 30 FGs, one less than the 31 made baskets in the before era.

So, how do we account for the five point difference if not the existence of the 3-pointer?

In each of Knight’s last two Final Four seasons, Indiana shot six more free throws and made five of them. Neither the shot clock nor 3-pointers made any qualitative difference in the seasonal scoring totals. The increase in scoring occurred at the free throw line.

In response, you might be tempted to make the “gravity” argument: that the existence of the 3-pointer pulled Indiana’s defenders farther from the basket making them vulnerable to shot fakes and drives to the rim where they fouled the Hoosier shooters more often… and therefore, the threat of 3-pointers was the reason Indiana averaged five more FTs per a game during Knight’s last two championship runs than his first two, but I think you’d be hard pressed to back up such a claim with film footage as 84% of Indiana’s shot attempts came from inside the 3-pt arc. 

In many ways, Knight’s modest use of the 3-pointer was indicative of college basketball during  the first twenty-nine years of Era 4 when the national average of 3-point attempts hovered around 16 per game. Finally, in 2015-16, the average jumped to 20, beginning an eleven-year run of 3-point attempts at 22 per season. 

So, the evolution of offensive theory and best practice often moves slowly.

In the weeks ahead, we’ll delve into each era examining various offensive “artifacts” much like we did in our investigation of Doc, Mac, and Noah. We can’t study everything but we can select those systems that are representative of each era as well as those that might be considered outliers. 

Along the way, we’ll compare what we find, uncovering the organizing principles and philosophy behind each attack and tracing the evolution of offense over the last 132 years.